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 1 
Donald J. Boudreaux and Roger Meiners* 
EXTERNALITY: ORIGINS AND 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Externalities are ubiquitous in academic writing1 and, by definition, in the 
life of everyone. As economist Bryan Caplan explains, “positive externalities are 
benefits that are infeasible to charge to provide; negative externalities are costs that 
are infeasible to charge to not provide.”2 Economists and other policy advocates 
often urge governments to adopt policies that internalize an externality, so that 
costs and benefits will affect mainly parties who choose to incur them.3 
Decisions by people and facts of nature affect us physically and mentally 
in positive and negative ways. People born with good looks earn a beauty premium 
that is largely independent of occupation.4 While we cannot do much about the 
faces we were born with, we can send signals to others by wearing stylish clothing 
and driving prestige cars. Such things create “positional externalities” causing 
resources to be frittered away on needless spending.5 Some argue that public 
policies should be considered to deal with such things.6 
 
* Boudreaux is Professor of Economics at George Mason University and Getchell Chair at George 
Mason’s Mercatus Center; Meiners is the Goolsby-Rosenthal Chair in Economics and Law at the 
University of Texas-Arlington. We thank the participants at a workshop at Case Western Reserve 
University Law School, sponsored by PERC of Bozeman, Montana, and the Searle Freedom 
Foundation, for unusually beneficial comments on an earlier version. We also thank the editors of this 
journal for guidance. 
 1. A search of “Law Reviews” in Nexis Uni shows an average of almost a thousand articles per 
year that mention externalities. Economics journals are similarly rife with discussion of externality 
issues. This is not so in court opinions; courts rarely use the term. See Roger Meiners, Externalities: Bad 
Economics, Good Law, in EXPLORATIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY PROMINENT 
ECONOMISTS 61-91 (J. Hall ed., 2017). 
 2. Bryan Caplan, Externalities, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/
Externalities.html?highlight=%5B%22externality%22%5D (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). 
 3. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). 
 4. This is true of men and women. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor 
Market, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1174 (1994); see also Chris Warhurst et al., Lookism: The New Frontier of 
Employment Discrimination?, 51 J. INDUS. REL. 131 (2009). 
 5. Michael A. Lewis, The Spending Explosion: Positional Externalities and Exponential 
Consumption Growth, 7 J. APPLIED QUANTITATIVE METHODS 25 (2012). 
 6. Robert H. Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Positional Externalities?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 
1777 (2008) (We are not making light of the matter, we have no doubt such things are real. The list of 
problems is nearly endless and parties devise interesting ways to handle them. For example, sex bias in 
orchestra auditions may be reduced by having candidates behind a curtain when they perform.); see 
Claudia Golden & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of ‘Blind’ Auditions on 
Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000). 
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Economists also worried about consumption externalities: “keeping up 
with the Joneses.”7 That is, people feel bad about the nifty things their neighbors 
buy, so they make purchases to compensate for self-perceived deficiencies. This 
leads to a “misallocation” of resources that might be corrected by taxes.8 Going 
further, we may compare ourselves to people in other countries (global positional 
externalities) that could be solved by a “Pareto-efficient tax policy in a cooperative 
framework” (i.e., transnational) that will produce “large welfare gains.”9 
Public-policy interventions in most aspects of existence may be justified 
on the grounds that externalities impose harms on society that can be reduced, or 
create benefits that can be increased, by edicts that address the issues. For example, 
if you own an old house you might find it subject to regulations that restrict what 
you may do with it.10 Why do we have such interventions? The rationale is that 
they are good for society. Property values are higher when historical houses are 
forced to be preserved; they are “positive externalities” some argue.11 Such policies 
promote “revitalization” without “gentrification.”12 The same was found to be the 
case in London, where preservation requirements lead to “positive heritage 
externalities” so people “acknowledge the need for planning control, and execute 
their right to object to neighbour’s planning request.”13 
Evaluating the pervasive role of externalities in the academic literature 
requires that we understand what it means. In this introductory section, we give an 
idea of the extent of the use of externality.14 In the following section, we work 
through the history of the development of the concept during the past century, 
 
 7. Thomas Aronsson & Olof Johansson-Stenman, Keeping Up with the Joneses, the Smiths, and 
the Tanakas: On International Tax Coordination and Social Comparisons, 131 J. PUB. ECON. 71 (2015) 
(“[P]eople’s reference consumption is increasingly determined by consumption levels in other countries 
than their own.”). 
 8. “Corrective” taxes are commonly posited as the solution to the externality problem. See, e.g., 
Paul Eckerstorfer & Ronald Wendner, Asymmetric and Non-Atmospheric Consumption Externalities, 
and Efficient Consumption Taxation, 106 J. PUB. ECON. 42 (2013). 
 9. Aronsson & Johansson-Stenman, supra note 7. “Keeping up with the Joneses” can mean 
overconsumption, which could lead to obesity, which is an externality. See Roberta Mann, Controlling 
the Environmental Costs of Obesity, 47 ENVTL. L. 697 (2017). 
 10. A homeowner in Santa Monica learned to her dismay at the designation when she put her house 
on the market. Due to the designation, the house sold for 20 percent less than it would have otherwise. 
See R. Daniel Foster, L.A. Discovers Historic Preservation, and Promptly Goes Overboard, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/l-a-discovers-historic-preservation-and-promptly-goes-
overboard-1504303407. 
 11. Andrew Narwold, Estimating the Value of the Historical Designation Externality, 1 INT’L J. 
HOUSING MKTS. & ANALYSIS 288 (2008). 
 12. N. Edward Coulson & Robin Leichenko, Historic Preservation and Neighbourhood Change, 41 
URB. STUD. 1587 (2004). The same authors found “significant, positive externalities associated with 
historic designation” in Abilene, Texas. N. Edward Coulson & Robin M. Leichenko, The Internal and 
External Impact of Historical Designation of Property Values, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 113 
(2001). 
 13. Nancy Holman & Gabriel Ahlfeldt, No Escape? The Coordination Problem in Heritage 
Preservation, 47 ENV’T & PLAN. 172, 172 (2015). 
 14. No doubt readers know externality in the environmental context. The discussion above indicates 
that the concept has been applied in nearly every conceivable area of human action. Simply asserting 
something to be an externality commonly leads to the presumption that policy intervention is justified. 
As such, the concept becomes tautological and adds little of value. 
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focusing on leading architects of the concept such as A.C. Pigou. Next, we examine 
how Pigou affected the development of externality concepts in subsequent decades. 
Then, in the next major section, we argue that the term has become nearly 
meaningless due to its ubiquity, so we develop a classification for the major 
categories of externalities based on economic and legal logic. We contend that the 
instances in which policy actions are justified to deal with what are purported to be 
externalities are very small. 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNALITY: MARSHALL AND 
PIGOU 
The earliest developers of the concepts of external economies and 
diseconomies were Alfred Marshall, a major economist who wrote the leading text 
in economics from 1890 to 1920, and Arthur Cecil Pigou, one of his students, and 
the successor to his chair at Cambridge, who was a major figure in the profession in 
the first half of the 20th century.15 
Marshall, in his oft-cited 8th edition of his Principles of Economics, 
explained that external economies were factors relevant to a firm that were from 
the outside, such as better technology that could be adopted. Internal economies 
were factors under the control of those running a firm, for example, a clever 
manager figuring out how to run a firm better. “External economies,” Marshall 
wrote, are related to scale of production; they are “those dependent on the general 
development of the industry,” whereas “internal economies” are “those dependent 
on the resources of the individual houses of businesses engaged in it [a particular 
kind of production].”16 External economies grew as technology improved and 
large-scale production came to dominate industry. This was valuable knowledge 
“beyond the reach of anyone who could not afford to have well-paid agents in 
many distant places.”17 That is, small producers had access to valuable information 
that allowed them the possibility of more efficient, larger-scale production. This 
knowledge enhanced the “efficiency of capital and labour.”18 
Improved knowledge allows greater efficiencies in production, so supply 
can be expanded at lower per unit cost. However, there is a downside to such 
productivity. Marshall worried that large-scale efficiency could result in what is 
called a “natural monopoly”—when one firm can serve the market at lower cost 
than could two or more smaller firms. Natural monopolies require government 
intervention so as to maximize social welfare.19 However, Marshall opposed 
“collective ownership of the means of production” as it would “deaden the energies 
of mankind, and arrest economic progress.”20 
 
 15. See EDWIN S. MILLS & PHILIP E. GRAVES, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 2 
(2d ed. 1986). 
 16. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 266 (8th ed. 1920). 
 17. Id. at 284-85. 
 18. Id. at 314. 
 19. Id. at 503. 
 20. Id. at 713. That is the closing statement in his text, likely in opposition to Marxist thought much 
in vogue at the time. 
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Marshall did not discuss pollution; however, he noted that “waste”—
things thrown away in the production process—is reduced by large-scale producers 
who make more efficient use of inputs. “No doubt many of the most important 
advances of recent years have been due to the utilizing of what had been a waste 
product.”21 Fifty years later, the Marshallian view of external economies still held 
sway. In a leading microeconomic theory text, external economies were still 
discussed in terms of greater industrial efficiency resulting from technical 
improvements that force competitors to operate more cost-effectively. 22 
Diseconomies are external effects that raise firms’ costs; pollution is not mentioned 
in this text. 
While Marshall mentioned the notion of external impacts on production, 
the modern form of externality as a pervasive concept began with Pigou.23 We 
review his work at some length as his view is similar to how externality is now 
employed. Pigou acknowledged that private-property-based free markets often 
work well. However, “even Adam Smith had not realized fully the extent to which 
the System of Natural Liberty needs to be qualified and guarded by special laws, 
before it will promote the most productive employment of a country’s resources.”24 
According to Pigou, the price system and legal and social institutions fail 
to cause all to act in ways that maximize social welfare. This failure justifies 
government intervention to correct the imperfections. Widespread market failures 
prevent a community’s resources from being distributed among different uses or 
occupations in the most effective way. The study [of this problem] . . . seeks to 
bring into clearer light some of the ways in which it now is, or eventually may 
become, feasible for governments to control the play of economic forces in such 
wise as to promote the economic welfare, and, through that, the total welfare of 
their citizens as a whole.25 
Pigou explains how economists should deal with this problem: 
[W]e have next to distinguish precisely between the two varieties 
of marginal net product which I have named 
respectively social and private. The marginal social net product 
is the total net product of physical things or objective services 
due to the marginal increment of resources in any given use or 
place, no matter to whom any part of this product may accrue. It 
might happen, for example, as will be explained more fully in a 
later chapter, that costs are thrown upon people not directly 
concerned, through, say, uncompensated damage done to 
surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines. All such 
effects must be included - some of them will be positive, others 
negative elements - in reckoning up the social net product of the 
 
 21. Id. at 279. 
 22. JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL 
APPROACH 111 (2d ed. 1971). 
 23. ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). 
 24. Id. at 128. 
 25. Id. at 129-30. 
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marginal increment of any volume of resources turned into any 
use or place.26 
Pigou explains further: 
[I]f private and social net products everywhere coincide, the free 
play of self-interest, so far as it is not hampered by ignorance, 
will tend to bring about such a distribution of resources among 
different uses and places as will raise the national dividend and, 
with it, the sum of economic welfare to a maximum. . . . The 
essential point for our present purpose is that, when marginal 
private net products and marginal social net products coincide, 
any obstacles that obstruct the free play of self-interest will, in 
general, damage the national dividend [income]. In real life, of 
course, marginal private and marginal social net products 
frequently do not coincide.27 
Much of the market’s failure to produce maximum national income arises 
from “imperfect knowledge on the part of those in whose hands the power to direct 
the various branches of the stream [of resources] resides.”28 Pigou argues that 
private resource owners will not maximize social value: 
In general industrialists are interested, not in the social, but only 
in the private, net product of their operations. . . . [Self-interest] 
will not tend to bring about equality in the values of the marginal 
social net products except when marginal private net product and 
marginal social net product are identical. When there is a 
divergence between these two sorts of marginal net products, 
self-interest will not, therefore, tend to make the national 
dividend a maximum; and, consequently, certain specific acts of 
interference with normal economic processes may be expected, 
not to diminish, but to increase the dividend.29 
While Pigou does not call the divergence between social and private cost 
an externality, what he explains is the essence of the concept as now employed.30 
 
 26. Id. at 134 (Pigou recognized that transportation cost played a role in determining where 
resources would be allocated. He took such costs as a fact that prevented what might otherwise be a 
superior allocation of recourses. Id. at 138-39. He did not discuss other transaction costs that “limit” the 
“best” distribution of resources. It fell largely to Ronald Coase later to note the prevalence of transaction 
costs and their effects on resource allocation. Part of the genius of successful organizations is to reduce 
such costs. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)); see also 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). 
 27. See PIGOU supra note 23 at 143 (Pigou’s presumption appears to be that scientifically minded 
state planners know better how to use resources than do self-interested individuals making decisions 
about resource allocation. Pigou was not much interested in pollution per se; his focus was on optimal 
resource use to maximize the productive value of given resources.). 
 28. Id. at 149. That is, the fact of imperfect knowledge causes wealth production to be lower than it 
could be. This conclusion is much like saying engines would work better if friction did not exist. 
 29. Id. at 172. Pigou understood incentives. He noted that tenants would treat property differently 
than would property owners. Id. at 183. 
 30. Id. at 134. 
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He saw the problem as being widespread.31 Pigou gave numerous examples of what 
we would call negative and positive externalities, all of which are explained to be a 
form of market failure that warrants consideration of state intervention to close the 
gap between private and social costs. For example, lighthouses provide benefits for 
ships that do not pay for their services.32 Public roads may provide higher real-
estate values for adjoining landowners.33 Inventors produce valuable knowledge 
that can be exploited by others for their personal and social gain.34 While new 
production may add wealth, factory smoke may dim sunlight and inflict filth on 
buildings and laundries. Intoxicating beverages that we enjoy may also lead to the 
need for more prisons and policemen.35 In all such situations, social and private 
costs and benefits diverge and are not easy to resolve due to “technical difficulty of 
enforcing compensation for incidental disservices.”36 
There is much in the world not to like, both today and in Pigou’s time. He 
explained what he saw as the single worst social cost: 
[T]he crowning illustration of this order of excess of private over 
social net product is afforded by the work done by women in 
factories, particularly during the periods immediately preceding 
and succeeding confinement; for there can be no doubt that this 
work often carries with it, besides the earnings of the women 
themselves, grave injury to the health of their children. The 
reality of this evil . . . .37 
One deals with such evil by legislation and regulation: 
It is plain that divergences between private and social net product 
. . . cannot . . . be mitigated by a modification of the contractual 
relation between any two contracting parties, because the 
divergence arises out of a service or disservice rendered to 
persons other than the contracting parties. It is, however, possible 
for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the divergence in any 
field by ‘extraordinary encouragements’ or ‘extraordinary 
restraints’ upon investments in that field. The most obvious 
forms which these encouragements and restraints may assume 
are, of course, those of bounties and taxes.38 
 
 31. See generally id. at 129. 
 32. The scholar credited with first introducing lighthouses as supplying a good that cannot be 
adequately supplied in free markets is the British economist Henry Sidgwick. See HENRY SIDGWICK, 
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1883). 
 33. PIGOU, supra note 23, at 184. 
 34. Id. at 184-85. 
 35. Id. at 186. Pigou did not mention the health injuries that might be inflicted by pollution; the 
injury was to vegetables, laundries, and buildings. Perspectives change with knowledge, but the 
essential point is unchanged. Id. at 184. 
 36. Id. at 185. Later, Coase encouraged us to think of these as transaction costs. 
 37. Id. at 187. 
 38. Id. at 192. 
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His call for subsidies and taxes to reduce the gaps between social and 
private costs is a bedrock in modern externality analysis as we will see in later 
literature. 
THE 1950S AND 1960S 
Building on Pigou, the next generation of work on externalities included 
an influential 1954 article by Professor Tibor Scitovsky of Stanford. He explained 
that “external economies are a cause for divergence between private profit and 
social benefit and thus for the failure of perfect competition to lead to an optimum 
situation . . . .”39 
In discussing when externalities arise, Scitovsky identified “four types of 
direct interdependence”: 1) when one’s satisfaction is related to the satisfaction of 
another person; 2) when one’s satisfaction is affected by inconveniences, such as 
smoke from production; 3) when producers learn to offer goods and services at 
lower cost, so as to offer more satisfaction at lower cost; and 4) when the output of 
a producer depends on the activities of other firms.40 
Scitovsky explained that economists generally have little to say about the 
first kind of externality, the “interdependence of consumers’ satisfaction,” even 
though they know it is extremely important.41 Economists are not good at 
understanding interpersonal utility or satisfaction. 
As an indication of how times change (many pollution levels were much 
higher in the 1950s than they are to today42), Scitovsky thought that the second 
kind of externality, such as emissions from production, were “unimportant” as they 
could be handled by zoning rules (move producers to industrial areas) or 
regulations for public health and safety.43 
Similarly, the third kind of externality, which as noted by Marshall and 
Pigou is the one that occurs as more efficient methods of production cascade 
through to other production processes, was also regarded by Scitovsky as 
unimportant. He regarded it as unimportant in a policy sense because patents for 
innovations allow innovators to capture gains and so encourages such productive 
activities. Innovators sell their output to buyers who benefit by using the new 
technology in their production. Other innovations result from research sponsored 
by the public, such as in agriculture, where the research results are made available 
to all. 
 
 39. Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL. ECON. 143, 143 (1954). 
 40. Id. at 144. The article is called “two concepts” but the first four fit into the general notion of 
externality; the second concept he discussed relates to “industrialization of underdeveloped countries” 
where economists worry about incentives for savings tied to investment opportunities and about the 
desired amount of public investment in roads and such. It also mattered in a general equilibrium analysis 
of an economy where investment in industry A could spill over to benefit the development of industry 
B. One can see the impetus such work could produce for those concerned with central planning of an 
economy, but we will ignore this kind of externality. Id. at 145. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Although the population almost tripled, SO2 emissions in 2010 were less than half of what they 
were in 1950 in North America. See Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, Air Pollution, OUR WORLD IN DATA 
(last modified Oct. 2017), https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution/. 
 43. Scitovsky, supra note 39, at 144. 
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The fourth kind of externality, interdependence among producers, seemed 
to Scitovsky to be “few” and so of little import.44 Such an externality can involve 
unpaid factors of production. Scitovsky recalled an earlier paper by James E. 
Meade, in which Meade gave the example of apple orchards benefiting from bees, 
which allowed beekeepers to benefit from apple blossoms, even though the two 
may not have contact with each other.45 If one or both of these parties fail to take 
adequate account of the effects of his actions on the output of the other party, there 
will be a sub-optimal production of apples and of honey. This divergence from 
optimality could justify a subsidy paid by apple growers to the beekeepers to 
encourage beekeepers to produce more honey.46 
Similarly, the relationship among outputs as one firm’s knowledge or 
product spills over to others, as noted by Marshall, played a role in the literature on 
network externalities. The benefit one receives from a good, such as the telephone 
or the Internet, depends on how many other users there are. Without a network of 
other users who rely on products of others, phones or the Internet have little or no 
value.47 
Economists have long distinguished “technical” from “pecuniary” 
externalities.48 This distinction originated with Jacob Viner. Within a firm, 
“technological internal economies would be savings in the labor, materials, or 
equipment requirements per unit of output resulting from improved organization or 
methods of production” whereas pecuniary internal economies “consist of 
advantages in buying, such as ‘quantity discounts’ . . . .”49 
While distinctions are made between technical and pecuniary economies, 
the form does not matter to the firm or the individual decision maker because both 
results represent financial benefits or losses. A gain is a gain, and a loss is a loss. 
Economists, however, continue to distinguish technical from pecuniary 
 
 44. Id. at 145. In contrast, in more recent times much has been made of “agglomeration 
externalities” that arise as groups of educated people benefit from each other. Acknowledging that this is 
obviously true does not justify government intervention. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, 
The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States, 47 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 983, 1014-15 (2009). 
 45. James E. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, 62 ECON. 
J. 54, 56 (1952). (Meade was awarded the 1977 Nobel Prize in economics, but not for this work). 
 46. Id. at 61. Meade later came to think subsidies and taxes may not be as justified as he thought 
earlier, as he expressed in a course that one of us took from him on externalities in 1974. Meade’s 
example of beekeepers and orchardists benefiting each other but not through formal arrangements was 
dismissed by Stephen N. S. Cheung. Stephen N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic 
Investigation, 16 J. L. & ECON. 11, 12 (1973). 
 47. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 133, 133-34 (1994). Network externalities generally provide positive benefits—for 
example, the more people who are connected to telephones or the Internet, the more useful these are to 
others. The authors say we should thing of “network effects” not “externalities” that imply something 
being imposed on someone against their will. 
 48. For an overview of the issue, see Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy 
Toward Pecuniary Externalities, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 304, 307 (2001). 
 49. Jacob Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NATIONALÖKONOMIE 23, 36 
(1931). 
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diseconomies, contending that the former matter to society while the latter do not.50 
The reason is that technical externalities are believed to reduce social welfare while 
pecuniary externalities do not. Put differently, technical externalities result in 
physical production that is either too much or too little while pecuniary 
externalities merely redistribute wealth among economic actors without 
diminishing it.51 
Following Scitovsky, F.M. Bator of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) published an influential article.52 Bator’s article likely forms the 
basis for the now-common notion of externality as demonstrated in the following 
discussion of the modern literature. Bator uses the notion of Paretian efficiency. If 
Pareto optimality53 is achieved in a society, no improvement in utility or efficiency 
is possible because no one can be made better off without making someone else 
worse off. Thus, society has achieved its “bliss point.”54 
Bator’s primary concern was with income redistribution via taxation to 
achieve social bliss, but his analysis applies to all economic matters. He notes that 
bliss is impossible due to “imperfect information, inertia and resistance to change, 
the infeasibility of costless lump-sum taxes, businessmen’s desire for a ‘quiet life,’ 
uncertainty and inconsistent expectations, the vagaries of aggregate demand, etc.”55 
Bator discusses multiple sources of market failure:56 
- Failure of existence due to lack of perfect marginal rates of 
substitution as related to input-output points or production needed to 
generate optimal prices); 
- Failure by signal concerning proper levels of profit for eac producer 
where having too much profit leads to over-allocation of resources in 
some areas and, on the converse side; 
 
 50. The Schoolmasters’ Case (1410) YB 11 Hen IV 47 pl 21 (republished in LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN & ELEANOR M. FOX, CASES & MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 18-19 (1986). 
 51. The economic view that pecuniary externalities are not things that should be of policy concern 
is consistent with the common law. There is no cause of action by an existing firm that suffers an 
income loss due to a new competitor. That rule goes back at least 700 years, as illustrated by the 
“Schoolmaster Case,” Hamlyn v. Moore, Court of Common Pleas, 11 Henry IV 47 (1410). In that case, 
two schoolmasters sued a new schoolmaster who opened in competition, drawing students and their 
tuition away. Revenues fell by more than two-thirds at the existing school. The court rejected the claim. 
As Judge Hank explained: “if my neighbor built a mill and those accustomed to patron my mill went 
instead to his, whereby my profits were diminished: I would have no action. But if a miller disturbed the 
water running to my mill, or performed some other such nuisance, I would have recourse such as the law 
provides.” Id. 
 52. Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958). According to 
Google Scholar, the article has been cited almost 2,000 times. 
 53. An allocation of resources is Pareto optimal if it cannot be changed without making at least one 
person worse off. In contrast, if the current allocation of resources can be rearranged in such a way as to 
improve the welfare of at least one person without making anyone worse off, this allocation is not Pareto 
optimal. In this case, the possibility exists for a “Pareto-superior” move - namely, reallocating resources 
in that way that makes at least one person better off without making anyone worse off. See, e.g., 
HENDERSON & QUANDT, supra note 22, at 255. 
 54. Bator, supra note 52, at 353-54. (The term “bliss point” must not be taken literally. An 
allocation of resources can be Pareto optimal even though many, or even most, individuals in society are 
poor and miserable.). 
 55. Id. at 352. 
 56. Id. at 353-54. 
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- Failure by incentive stemming from inadequate profits for some 
producers who should have higher levels to stimulate investment in 
their output; 
- Failure by structure because in the absence of perfect information 
and pure competition, prices and output will deviate from optimality, 
as we observe in many markets where a few firms dominate; and 
- Failure by enforcement due legal and organizational imperfections. 
Bator explains that the Lange-Lerner model57 of socialist directions 
(scientific planning of an economy) faces many difficulties and that the literature 
on all these issues is complex and convoluted. 
As explained by Marshall and Pigou, the existence of market 
imperfections requires that industries and individuals should be taxed and 
subsidized to bring society closer to bliss.58 Bator noted that economists who wrote 
soon after Marshall and Pigou, including Dennis Robertson, Piero Sraffa, Frank 
Knight, and Jacob Viner, demonstrated that the conclusion that such taxes and 
subsidies are necessary is mistaken.59 Changes in ownership arrangements can 
internalize many technological economies, while pecuniary external economies in 
competitive markets are simply the evidence and consequences of competition.60 
Bator explains that this conclusion leaves as problems only those technological 
external economies (“externalities”) that cannot be handled by a change in 
ownership arrangements. Those markets, and this description applies generally, 
“will be efficient if, and only if, this private marginal cost ratio reflects the true 
marginal cost to society of an extra apple in terms of foregone honey[.]”61 This 
class of externalities, however, is huge. In them, market prices “diverge from true, 
social marginal cost.”62 Bator’s explanation of social marginal cost in case of 
external technological economies is what economists have worried about ever 
since. 
To illustrate the point about social marginal costs and technical 
externalities, Bator gives examples of bridges and radio.63 Bridges face lumpiness 
in use not resolved by pricing.64 We have limited options in what we hear on the 
radio—including advertisements. Bator notes that many functioning markets are 
 
 57. Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner argued that socialist central planners could govern a socialist 
economy so that it achieves the optimal pattern of resource allocation that would be achieved by 
perfectly competitive free markets but without the wastes and imperfections of actual competition. 
Lange and Lerner agreed with prominent critics of socialism that optimal resource allocation is 
impossible without reliance on prices. But Lange and Lerner - contrary to the critics of socialism - 
believed that an appropriately designed and operated system of central planning could set prices with 
even greater accuracy than could real-world competition among private sellers and buyers. See generally 
DON LAVOIE, RIVALRY AND CENTRAL PLANNING: THE SOCIALIST CALCULATION DEBATE 
RECONSIDERED (1985). 
 58. Bator, supra note 52, at 357. 
 59. See generally Frank H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. 
ECON. 582 (1924). 
 60. Bator, supra note 52, at 357. 
 61. Id. at 360. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 361-62. 
 64. Id. at 362. 
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afflicted with externalities that justify consideration of state-imposed 
improvements.65 Externality, therefore, should mean “any situation where some 
Paretian costs and benefits remain external to decentralized cost-revenue 
calculation in terms of prices.”66 That is, we are not at bliss points due to 
“uncompensated services” and “incidental uncharged disservices” that are the 
essence of market failure. 
Bator then argues that there are three, sometimes overlapping, categories 
of externalities: 
First are ownership externalities. Even if markets work perfectly (“an 
Adam Smith dream world”), due to “circumstances of institutions, laws, customs, 
or feasibility, competitive markets would not be Pareto-efficient.”67 This problem 
exists in private venues, such as beekeepers’ interactions with orchardists, and in 
the public sector, such as in public-domain fishing waters. 
Second are technical externalities. These arise from lumpiness or 
indivisibility in many goods, such as bridges. These would benefit from “a set of 
shadow-prices which, if centrally quoted, would efficiently ration among 
consumers the associated (fixed) total of goods.”68 
Third are public good externalities. A pure public good is one where 
consumption by one person does not affect consumption by another (e.g., the 
benefits I receive from national defense against North Korean missiles do not affect 
your ability to “consume” or to enjoy the same benefits).69 As the price mechanism 
cannot work for demanders and suppliers, administered prices are required.70 He 
cites lighthouses, schools, and open-air concerts among many examples, but not 
pollution.71 
About the time Bator’s article was published, Ronald Coase argued that 
the radio spectrum could be privatized to improve its efficiency.72 At that time, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) granted licenses to use bits of the 
spectrum. It was asserted that regulation was the only way to prevent one spectrum 
user from disturbing the use of another spectrum user, otherwise, broadcasts would 
spill over into each other. Scientific control by the FCC was needed to prevent 
chaos, cut-throat competition, and allow for the orderly development of radio and 
then television. Private enterprise could not work.73 Coase testified before the FCC 
 
 65. Id. at 357. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 364. 
 68. Id. at 368. 
 69. Id. at 370. Bator drew on Paul Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public 
Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955). 
 70. Id. at 372. 
 71. Bator was writing when air pollution was likely at its worst in the United States. Pollution was 
so bad in Los Angeles that crops were injured and many people suffered from the effects. Air pollution 
is now a tiny fraction of what existed in the 1950s and 1960s but, given the paucity of notice by 
economists anyway, must have been considered an unavoidable part of economic progress. See, e.g., 
David Parrish & William Stockwell, Urbanization and Air Pollution: Then and Now, EOS EARTH & 
SPACE SCI. NEWS (Jan. 8, 2015), https://eos.org/features/urbanization-air-pollution-now. 
 72. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 
(1959). 
 73. Id. at 13. 
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in 1959 and argued that the spectrum could be efficiently privatized.74 Apparently, 
commissioners were scandalized by this strange notion proposed by a professor 
with a British accent; one commissioner even asking him if the proposal was a “big 
joke.”75 
The broadcast spectrum fits Bator’s definition of technical limitations that 
require government intervention. However, Coase noted that, among other things, 
because the government controlled the licensing, valuable licenses were not handed 
out randomly; they went to favored interests allowing them to obtain 
“extraordinary” gains.76 Coase explained the then-revolutionary idea that spectrum 
can be made private property just as land is owned by private parties.77 The fact 
that there is a fixed quantity of land does not mean it must be in public hands to 
ensure its efficient use. “The advantage of establishing exclusive rights to use a 
resource when that use does not harm others (apart from the fact that they are 
excluded from using it) is easily understood.”78 Once private rights exist, parties 
may bargain over how the property is used, with the party who values a piece of 
property most highly being the one who ends up owning it. 
In the FCC paper, Coase explained what has come to be called the Coase 
Theorem,79 although his more famous paper of the following year is more 
commonly cited as the source of this Theorem.80 Coase used an 1879 case, Sturges 
v. Bridgman81 to illustrate.82 A confectioner used his property for years for 
business. A doctor later came to occupy adjoining property. There were no 
problems until eight years later when the doctor built a consulting room that 
abutted the confectioner’s premises. Noise and vibration from the confectioner’s 
machinery disturbed the doctor’s consulting room. The doctor sued and obtained an 
injunction against the machinery.83 
Coase did not address Bator’s concerns about market imperfections from 
lumpiness, dominant firms, and other external effects in either paper; rather Coase 
focused on the importance of property rights and the ability to exchange these 
 
 74. Ronald H. Coase, Testimony to the Federal Communications Commission, 2 MAN & ECON. 1 
(2015). 
 75. Dieter Bohn, Ronald Coase, the ‘Father’ of the Spectrum Auction, Dies at 102, VERGE (Sept. 3, 
2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/3/4691908/ronald-coase-the-father-of-the-spectrum-auction-
dies-at-102. 
 76. Coase, supra note 72, at 23. 
 77. Id. at 15, 17-18. 
 78. Id. at 26. 
 79. While Coase objected to this formulation being called “the Coase theorem,” this is a standard 
version: ‘Formally, the theorem states that in a competitive economy with symmetric information and 
zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources will be efficient and invariant with respect to legal 
rules of entitlement, or property rights,” When these conditions hold, “The implication of the theorem is 
that there is no need for policy intervention with regard to externalities except to ensure that property 
rights are clearly defined and protected.” See Coase Theorum, A DICTIONARY OF ECON. (3d ed., 
2013); see Henry Mohrman, Coase on the Coase Theorem, ‘The Social Cost Controversy, 2 MAN & 
ECON. 215 (2015) (For a discussion of how Coase viewed the Coase Theorem). 
 80. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960). 
 81. Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879). 
 82. See Coase, supra note 72, at 26. 
 83. Id. (noted that owning a bit of the radio spectrum would be the same. The owner could sue for 
interference.). 
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rights. His more famous “Social Cost” paper is, for most readers, difficult to 
comprehend as a whole. However, it is cited to support many propositions and is 
said to be the most cited publication in law and economics.84 
In his papers, Coase did not use the terms externality or external costs, 
although many economists directly associate the Coase Theorem with those 
concepts. His non-use of the term externality was intentional. He explained: 
But, as employed today, the term carries with it the connotation 
that when “externalities” are found, steps should be taken by the 
government to eliminate them. As already indicated, the only 
reason individuals and private organizations do not eliminate 
them is that the gain from doing so would be offset by what 
would be lost (including the costs of making the arrangements 
necessary to bring about this result). If with government 
intervention the losses also exceed the gains from eliminating the 
“externality,” it is obviously desirable that it should remain. To 
prevent being thought that I shared the common view, I never 
used the word “externality” in “The Problem of Social Cost” but 
spoke of “harmful effects” without specifying whether decision-
makers took them into account or not.85 
Coase directly addressed Pigou’s welfare economics and its concern with 
the divergence of social and private costs.86 Coase used Pigou’s example of sparks 
from a railroad causing fires to adjoining farmland.87 Pigou saw the cost of fire as a 
social cost—that is, uncompensated damage that injured the social optimum. But as 
Coase explained, statutory law in Britain often exempted railroad from liability for 
fires caused by sparks from engines.88 Pigou was apparently ignorant of the law 
but, more importantly, viewed the matter as a cost imposed unilaterally by the 
railroad on adjacent property owners.89 The divergence between social and private 
cost could, given Pigou’s logic, be reduced if the railroad is forced to pay 
compensation and, thus, is forced to “internalize” the cost it imposes on 
landowners. 
 
 84. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2012) (Citation numbers are a bit dubious; nevertheless it is highly cited. 
“Social Cost” may be the most cited paper in law reviews.) It should be noted that his 1937 paper 
presaged the later papers in that it made the point that transaction costs are critical to many things, 
including the existence of firms. In a world of zero transaction cost there would be no need for 
organizations such as firms. Ronald H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 85. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 26-27 (1988). Therefore, Herbert 
Hovenkamp, in an article critical of Coase’s harsh treatment of Pigou, errs when he writes that “Coase 
uses the term ‘externality’ to signify the difference between marginal social and marginal private net 
product.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 634,635 
(2009). 
 86. Coase, supra note 80, at 1 (beginning his article by noting Pigou’s concern with the divergence 
between private and social costs). 
 87. Id. at 29-31. 
 88. Id. at 30. 
 89. See generally id. at 29. 
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Coase’s celebrated insight is that it does not matter who has the liability so 
long as a property-rights assignment exists and the parties are able to bargain.90 
Another key insight is that costs are reciprocal; each party’s action, or inaction, 
contributes to the problem. Therefore, if bargaining is possible, the parties can be 
expected to choose to minimize the costs of their interactions regardless of who is 
initially assigned the right.91 
Suppose, for example, the expected value of the damage from fires is 
greater than the cost of limiting sparks by investing in spark arresters. Hence, if the 
railroad has the right to emit fire-causing sparks, sparks will be emitted despite the 
fact that the damage caused by the sparks is greater than the cost of preventing the 
damage. After all, the cost of fire damage is borne by landowners and not by the 
railroad.92 Coase’s insight is that the ability to bargain is sufficient to internalize 
this cost. Landowners will offer to pay the railroad to prevent sparks from flying. 
The landowners will offer an amount greater than the railroad’s cost of preventing 
the sparks. If the railroad stubbornly refused the landowners’ offer, the cost of the 
resulting fire damage would be internalized on the railroad in the form of foregone 
payments from landowners.93 Seeking to avoid this cost, which is, by assumption 
here, higher than the cost of using spark arresters, the railroad’s self-interest will 
likely prompt it to accept the offered payments and install spark arresters. 
The outcome would be no different if the landowners owned the right to 
be free of fire from railroad sparks. Then, the railroad would have to compensate 
landowners for fire damage caused by railroad sparks. Using its lower-cost option, 
the railroad would install spark arresters rather than pay to landowners the higher-
cost damages for fires caused by sparks. 
On a separate matter than the exposition of what is now called “the Coase 
Theorem,” Coase criticized Pigou for not bothering to investigate the law regarding 
railroad liability before decrying what he concluded was the obvious injustice of 
the rule.94 Pigou, like modern welfare economists, seems to presume that 
enlightened government leaders will get the rules right if economists point out to 
them defects in the rules that cause social waste. Parliament knew very well what it 
was doing when it passed the Railway (Fires) Act of 1905, which was amended 
various times, likely at the behest of affected parties.95 Coase’s point was that, like 
the rule or not due to its legislative origins, which may well reflect political special 
interests, it established a property right that parties were free to take into account as 
they organized their economic activity. 
Coase knew that Pigou understood that government agencies might not 
always perform as well as their champions wished.96 But Coase dismissed Pigou’s 
warning of poorly performing government agencies as formulaic and unreflective 
of Pigou’s confidence in such agencies. For evidence, Coase cites Pigou’s 
 
 90. See generally id. at 34. 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. See generally id. at 30. 
 93. Landowners could take other action, such as keeping a barren strip along the railroad so sparks 
would be less likely to cause fires. 
 94. Coase, supra note 80, at 31. 
 95. Id. at 30; see also COASE, supra note 85, at 22-23 (elaborating on his criticism of Pigou). 
 96. COASE, supra note 85, at 20. 
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optimism that improvements in democracy and in public administration, especially 
the advent of the independent regulatory commission, are sufficient to ensure that 
government (at least in the United Kingdom and the United States) will generally 
execute market-correcting tasks in the apolitical and scientific manner prescribed 
by economists such as Pigou.97 The bottom line, for Coase, of Pigou’s optimism 
about government’s capacity to correct market “imperfections” is that neither 
economists nor government officials take seriously enough the alternatives to 
regulatory intervention, including the alternative of what Coase described as 
“inaction.”98 
Besides a naïve view that politicians and other government officials will 
devise “optimal” solutions to “correct” the divergence of private from social cost, 
those who adopt this Pigouvian stance also fail to consider the social costs of 
government actions. The externality literature is overwhelmingly about private 
actors who allegedly need to be turned in other directions by corrective taxes, bans, 
limitations, or subsidies. For Coase, state-imposed rules also create costs that are 
unnecessary when judged by an inappropriate ideal that fails to account for the 
reality of transaction costs. 
Coase uses the example of a red light installed at an intersection.99 Drivers 
stop at red lights even when no crossing traffic or pedestrians are visible because 
the cost running a red light, a combination of the risk of getting a traffic ticket and 
of getting into an automobile accident, is too high. State-imposed rules, such as 
traffic laws, are inefficient when judged by the same standard of perfection against 
which private rules are typically judged. The social costs imposed by such 
imperfect state controls are largely ignored.100 When welfare economists and others 
prescribe “fixes” to social cost problems, they should, at a minimum, investigate 
the practicality of the consequences, including consequences of the proposed 
remedies, rather than assume that social planners know best. 
Government agencies routinely engage in cost-benefit analyses to assure 
us of the high value of rules that are imposed, but the analyses are often suspect.101 
Estimates by excellent economists about costs of economic events and government 
programs can vary wildly. The 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico caused 
many people to change their vacation plans that resulted in litigation. One estimate 
of loss suffered by recreationalists due to changes in plans resulting from the oil 
spill was $661 million; another group estimated the same loss to be 26 times 
 
 97. Id. at 21-22. 
 98. Id. at 24. 
 99. Coase, supra note 80, at 34. 
 100. Public-sector decision makers, especially politicians, are rife with perverse incentives, from the 
viewpoint of economic efficiency. They will allocate resources that provide current benefits to election 
supporters and divert resources from spending that may not have much current support as the benefits 
for the spending are too distant. 
 101. See, e.g., Roger Meiners & Rafal Czajkowski, Making Cost-Benefit a Political Tool, 3 LA. ST. 
U. J. ENERGY L. RESOURCES 225, 226, 247 (2014) (showing EPA takes credit for trillions of dollars 
worth of GDP). 
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greater.102 Imaginary numbers (or wild assumptions employed in devising 
numbers) are routinely made to bolster alleged values.103 
Pigou and Bator were among the many economists who believed that 
corrective taxes could align social and private costs so as to reduce undesirable 
behavior and compensate supposed aggrieved parties. That is, those suffering from 
smoke or railroad sparks would be compensated by the party that “caused” the 
externality. The notion of ownership, exchange, and liability apparently escaped 
attention. Presumably, if Pigou had understood that railroads had legislation in their 
favor, he would have objected and proposed reversing the rule. However, any 
imagined response by Pigou misses the point that the result, and costs, would be 
much the same regardless of the rule if bargaining is allowed. 
Welfare economists often argue that actual compensation of externality 
“victims” is not needed because corrective taxes, accurately set, are sufficient to 
adjust the behavior of the party engaged in the disfavored act to improve social 
productivity.104 The tax revenues can go to the general treasury.105 This conclusion 
ignores the social costs created by government use of resources. As explained by 
Armen Alchian and William Meckling: “The problem is identical with the familiar 
problem of divergence between private and social costs. Once tax receipts reach the 
Treasury, they are owned by no one. To the individuals entrusted with their 
expenditure, the costs of using these funds are not equal to their value. They are not 
required as a condition of survival to see that value of output exceeds the value of 
inputs.”106 The non-optimal use of resources107 moved to political control 
compounds the problem by charging imperfect government officials with the task 
of correcting “imbalances” between social and private cost imbalances. Real 
resources are always at stake and are entrusted to the tender mercies of politicians 
for distribution. 
To return to the evolution of economic thinking on externalities, next 
came two papers by James Buchanan. In the first paper, Buchanan begins by 
putting aside the notion that welfare economists can make meaningful policy 
prescriptions to solve the problems of market failure.108 He acknowledges that 
competitive markets do not satisfy the conditions for optimality.109 That is, bliss 
points - allocations of resources that cannot be improved upon - are constructs not 
 
 102. See Richard Bishop et al., Putting a Value on Injuries to Natural Assets: The BP Oil Spill, 356 
SCI. 253, 254 (2017) (showing the $17.2 billion estimate); see also Eric English et al., Estimating the 
Value of Lost Recreation Days from the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 91 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 26, 
27 (2017) (showing the $661 million estimate). 
 103. See generally Donald Boudreaux, Roger Meiners & Todd Zywicki, Talk Is Cheap: The 
Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999). 
 104. See, e.g., Eytan Shekhinski, On Atmosphere Externality and Corrective Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 
727 (2002). 
 105. Again, economists are not to be concerned with personal distribution of resources but with 
helping achieve optimal outcome for society. 
 106. William Meckling & Armen A. Alchian, Incentives in the United States, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 
55, 59 (1960). 
 107. Resources are allocated non-optimally if they can be reallocated in a way that makes at least 
one person better off without making any one worse off. See Bator, supra note 52. 
 108. James M. Buchanan, Politics, Policy and the Pigouvian Margins, 29 ECONOMICA 17 (1962). 
 109. Id. 
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related in any operational way to the real world. Economists cannot explain how to 
get society to nirvana; however, they talk as if such engineering is possible “to 
justify their own professional existence.”110 When Buchanan was writing in 1962, 
economists had devised the many prescriptions we hear today—”tax-subsidy 
schemes,” “multi-part pricing,” “collective stimulation of ideal market processes,” 
and other notions alleged to enhance economic efficiency.111 
Buchanan asked the question that if economists think their prescriptions 
are not, in fact, policy relevant, then why should they bother to advance such 
notions? To argue that the existing order is imperfect, and then to advance 
“solutions” that are recognized as unattainable is not as useful as focusing on what 
is likely to emerge in a majoritarian democracy.112 Each decision maker, including 
the politician and the polluter, balances social and private costs against social and 
private benefits as they understand the world. Cost margins in a world of private 
and political decision-makers are very different from those in the Pigovian world of 
universal benevolence. 
Buchanan said to think of a world in which all activity is organized 
privately except for things involving genuine public goods, where consumption by 
one person does not affect use by another person.113 Assume further that taxes for 
public goods are based on marginal benefits, so each person must pay a tax 
proportional to his own marginal rate of substitution between the collective good 
and all other goods. Different people would pay different taxes as the marginal 
utilities of these public goods would vary across people. Such a world is filled with 
externalities as each citizen “buys” public goods based on her evaluation of it. She 
considers her marginal benefit in her decision making, which includes whatever 
value she might assign to benefits others receive.114 
That paper was quickly followed by another in which Buchanan and Craig 
Stubblebine worked through the mechanics (math and graphs) of the notion of 
externalities and social equilibrium. They note that discussions of Pareto-relevant 
externalities are common but vague. They dispose of pecuniary externalities, 
focusing on technical externalities where the actions of an actor—an individual or a 
firm—impacts others.115 The discussion in the paper is precise, concerning 
equilibrium conditions, but it adds little that is relevant to our discussion here. 
Several years later, Buchanan added to the growing discussion in the 
1960s about how externalities could be internalized, or resolved, by the use of 
corrective taxes and subsidies.116 He demonstrates that imposing corrective taxes to 
 
 110. Id. at 18. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 21 (Buchanan was writing at the time he was working on The Calculus of Consent with 
Gordon Tullock, the primary reason he won the Nobel prize. He was explaining something that seems 
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 113. See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
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 114. See Buchanan, supra note 108, at 25-26. 
 115. James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 20 ECONOMICA 371 (1962). 
 116. See generally James M. Buchanan, External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market 
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deal with, say, pollution emitted by a firm in a less than purely competitive industry 
will reduce consumer welfare.117 The trend in welfare economics to divine proper 
taxes and subsidies is not beneficial. “Even if we disregard all problems of 
measurement, making the marginal private cost as faced by the decision-taking unit 
equal to marginal social cost does not provide the Aladdin’s Lamp for the applied 
welfare theorist.”118 With this piece concluding his work in the 1960’s, Buchanan 
left little room, based on economic theory, for externalities to be seen as policy 
relevant. 
The “Pigovian tradition” soon replied. William Baumol led the charge, 
contending that Coase, Buchanan, and others cast aspersions on Pigovian 
prescriptions “that might prove effective in practice.”119 While one-on-one 
bargaining cases need not be addressed as they are “relatively unimportant.”120 In 
large-number cases, such as air pollution or traffic congestion, “taxes upon the 
generator of the externality are all that is required.”121 The fact that the resulting 
allocation of resources is not optimal does not matter. Taxes and subsidies improve 
upon what exists even if they do not achieve bliss points. 
Baumol takes the classic example of the smoky factory that damages a 
neighbor’s laundry. Forget party-to-party bargaining, Baumol explains, the smoke 
is a public bad that should be taxed.122 When it is taxed, the smoke will be reduced 
and the laundry business will be in a better position, as will everyone else in 
society, due to the reduction in smoke. The laundry owner does not need to be 
compensated via the tax scheme; social benefits arise from the tax because the 
smoke is reduced to a reasonable level. If we want more output from a smoky 
factory, keep the tax low and there will be more factory output and laundries will 
not locate nearby, thereby producing a superior allocation of resources. 
While Baumol knows the tax/subsidy scheme will work, he admits that 
discovering the exact correct level of, say, smoke emissions, is difficult. After all, 
“a very substantial proportion of the cost of pollution is psychic;” and differs across 
people, so the measurement problems are immense.123 A process of trial and error 
of different tax rates might need to be worked through to iterate toward the socially 
optimal level of output. 
As optimal tax rates are unknowable in practice, Baumol recommends 
setting satisfactory levels of emissions.124 There needs to be a balance between 
emissions and production. He likens the matter to macroeconomic stabilization 
policy “where it is decided that an employment rate exceeding w percent and a rate 
 
 117. See id. at 176. 
 118. Id. at 177 (coming to this conclusion using the same theoretical models employed by welfare 
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of inflation exceeding v percent per year are simply unacceptable, and fiscal and 
monetary are then designed accordingly.”125 Such a policy avoids heavy 
administrative costs and does not use the police or the courts much. It is a system 
of direct controls “to achieve decreases in pollution . . . at minimum cost to 
society.”126 Policymakers should not be “paralyzed by councils of perfection”127 in 
an effort to achieve optimality, so we should have flexible rules that head us in the 
right direction. 
Baumol set the stage for how much of environmental economics has 
progressed since that time.128 In his view, economists could play a role in crafting 
“solutions” to assorted problems, including pollution.129 On the other side, Coase 
spawned a literature that focuses on property law and other institutional 
arrangements, formal and informal, that serve to resolve disputes over the use of 
resources without the need for top-down edicts.130 
Harold Demsetz explained this divide.131 He notes that Marshall’s primary 
concern about external impacts on industry efficiency, important in Marshall’s 
time, is rarely discussed now.132 The externalities that matter now are those in 
which one party inflicts costs on another party. These cases can be divided into two 
categories: the first is where bargaining between the parties is possible; the second 
is where such bargaining in too costly. 
The first of these two categories is illustrated by a tenant-landlord 
situation.133 The tenant has a short time horizon so little incentive to make long-
term investments that the landlord would like. Pigou thought legislation could help 
correct this situation; he ignored the ability of landlords and tenants to solve 
problems through the contracts that they strike with each other. It is now generally 
understood that Coasean bargains will resolve such problems.134 Of greater 
relevance are situations in which bargaining is too costly. In such cases, bargaining 
will not resolve differences between the parties, thereby leaving a gap between 
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 126. Id. at 319. 
 127. Id. at 320. 
 128. The field now known as environmental economics was just beginning to emerge at that time; 
prior to 1970 there was little federal intervention in the environmental area. The major statutes we know 
today were largely passed between 1970 and 1980. 
 129. See Baumol, supra note 119, at 314 (advocates crafting taxes as needed to find the “global 
optimum”). 
 130. Informal arrangements often handle problems, in some instances contrary to formal rules. See 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994). Even richer 
is the work of Elinor Ostrom on the evolution of ground-up institutions that resolve many resource 
conflicts. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 131. Harold Demsetz, The Core Disagreement between Pigou, the Profession, and Coase in the 
Analyses of the Externality Question, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 565 (1996). 
 132. Id. at 568. 
 133. See id. (Demsetz refers to the situation posed by Pigou regarding the different time horizons of 
landlords and tenants as explained next.). 
 134. Throughout his “social cost” paper, Coase uses disputes among property owners and users to 
illustrate how bargaining resolves differences in incentives thereby eliminating the notion of an 
unresolved issue, which many would call an externality, but Coase did not. Coase, supra note 80. 
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private and social cost, and, hence, leaving open the possibility that taxes or 
subsidies are the best means for achieving optimal outcomes.135 
Demsetz explains that Pigou, Meade, and others presumed too much when 
they asserted that bargaining will not resolve problems.136 Beekeepers and 
lighthouses were common examples used to show the market was limited in 
application. But those examples have been shown not to be descriptive of reality. 
Private parties discerned how to strike mutually beneficial deals or to otherwise 
devise efficiency-enhancing institutional arrangements.137 
Transactions entail transaction costs. Economists often assert that the 
Coasean world is one of zero transaction costs—when parties will surely reach a 
bargain. But Coase never meant a world of zero-transaction costs to be the center 
of analytic or policy attention.138 Zero transaction cost is much like a frictionless 
world; it is practically irrelevant. What is instructive is to understand how parties 
achieve resolution of problems in the real world of positive transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are why firms exist and why bargains are struck all the time, 
everywhere. The fact that transaction costs are pervasive is taken by the advocates 
of regulatory intervention as justification for “an expanded government role in 
resource allocation.”139 Coase’s acceptance of transaction costs, and the focus on 
the study of these costs, is what can help us challenge the presumption that the 
mythical state interested in perfecting the world, under the wise direction of learned 
economists, is required to resolve problems.140 
To briefly summarize, Marshall and, especially, Pigou launched the notion 
of external costs as a concern for economic analysis. Marshall saw these costs 
mostly in terms of what might now be called industrial policy; Pigou saw them 
more in terms of social issues, such as the problem of women working in factories. 
In the 1950 and 1960s, externality analysis was formalized more into the manner it 
is known today. Buchanan and others found the notion to have little analytic merit; 
in contrast, Baumol and others saw it as a tool for advancing policies to rectify 
social problems. 
WHERE WE ARE NOW 
By the 1970s, the notion of externalities had become entrenched and 
became particularly popular in the area of environmental economics. The notion 
now, at root, is normative, as Professor Carl Dahlman of the University of 
Wisconsin explains; it concerns assertions of market failure.141 
 
 135. Demsetz, supra note 131, at 569-70. 
 136. Id. at 571-73. 
 137. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357 (1974) 
(Bee keepers were noted previously; explaining how lighthouses were privately provided.). 
 138. Mohrman, supra note 79, at 221. 
 139. See Demsetz, supra note 131, at 573. 
 140. Id. at 576. 
 141. “[T]he concept of externalities - insofar as the word is intended to convey, as Buchanan and 
Stubblebine would have it, the existence of an analytically proven market failure - is void of any 
positive content but, on the contrary, simply constitutes a normative judgment about the role of 
government and the ability of markets to establish mutually beneficial exchanges. That is to say, it 
cannot be shown with purely conceptual analysis that markets do not handle externalities; any such 
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The argument can be summarized as follows. Market failure implies that 
there exists a reallocation of resources, such as a change in the structure of market 
activities that will enrich society. In more-formal economic terms, market failure 
exists whenever the existing resource allocation is declared to be Pareto-inefficient. 
As noted above, Pareto-efficient allocation of resources exists when no person can 
be made better off without making at least one other person worse off. Any Pareto-
inefficient allocation of resources, therefore, implies the possibility of changing 
resource allocation in a way that improves the well-being of at least one person 
without making anyone else worse off. Whenever a Pareto-inefficient allocation of 
resources persists, then the market is said to fail because the current arrangement 
leaves potential social gains on the table. 
Any failing market necessarily contains the opportunity for profit; that is, 
the possibility of converting unexploited “social gains” into exploited private 
gains.142 Whoever works successfully to improve the allocation of resources (say 
an “entrepreneur”) can profit from efforts: the person or persons who gain from the 
improved allocation will be willing to pay the entrepreneur for the results of his 
effort. The amount paid will be large enough to allow the entrepreneur not only to 
cover his costs (which might include compensating people who are harmed by his 
resource-reallocation efforts) but also to reap profit for his successful effort to 
improve the structure of resource allocation. 
Of course, the entrepreneur will undertake such efforts only if his 
expected cost of doing so falls short of his expected gain. This qualification is as it 
should be. Suppose, if we ignore whatever costs the entrepreneur must bear to 
change the pattern of resource allocation, the gain to society of changing the 
resource-allocation pattern is $100. If the cost to the entrepreneur is greater than 
$100, then efforts to change resource-allocation pattern are not worthwhile. If the 
entrepreneur who successfully changes the allocation pattern discovers that it costs 
$101 to do so, not only does he suffer a loss, society does too. It is wasteful from 
society’s perspective to use $101 worth of resources to generate $100 of benefit. 
Put differently, if the cost of improving the resource-allocation pattern is greater 
than the benefit from doing so, the unimproved pattern is optimal. The unimproved 
structure of resource allocation, it turns out, was Pareto efficient. The existing 
pattern did not reflect market failure. 
This logic prompts three different sorts of responses; responses from 
analysts we will call Stiglerians, Hayekians, and Stiglitzians.143 When Stiglerians144 
 
assertion necessitates an assumption that the government can do better. That this assumption is valid 
cannot be proved analytically, and it follows that market failure is an essentially normative judgment.” 
See generally Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. L. & ECON. 141 (1979). 
 142. Id. at 156. Dahlman explains that this view does not get us far. When transaction costs are 
lower, more deals will be consummated and the economy will grow, but making deals is costly as 
information costs and other issues come into play in the real world. Transaction costs are much like 
transportation costs. They are real costs; it would be nice if transportation costs were zero, but they are 
not, so fewer goods are shipped than if the costs did not exist. Hence “transaction costs per se have 
nothing to do with externalities.” Id. 
 143. These are over simplifications but help make the point about viewpoints that often color 
analysis. 
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are confronted by an Observer (one who makes observations about the state of the 
economy) with allegations of a market failure, Stiglerians reject the allegations. 
They argue that whatever exists is optimal, otherwise some profit-seeking party 
would have already acted to improve the situation. The Stiglerians assert, therefore, 
that the current situation only appears to the Observer to be suboptimal because the 
Observer fails to see and to account for some of the costs that must be incurred to 
rearrange the resource-allocation pattern. Because such costs cannot legitimately be 
ignored when assessing the propriety of rearranging the resource-allocation 
pattern—and because any worthwhile change will be brought about by economic 
agents—any assertion of market failure is a myth. 
When Hayekians145 are confronted by an Observer with assertions of some 
market failure, they acknowledge that the market may be failing. But Hayekians 
have confidence that the profit motive prompts people to discover ways to earn a 
profit by improving the pattern of resource allocation. Profit-seeking entrepreneurs 
can be relied upon to improve the matter soon enough. Like Stiglerians, Hayekians 
reject the notion that government officials, economists or not, are better than 
entrepreneurs and other economic actors at assessing the costs and benefits of 
resource allocation. Yet unlike Stiglerians, Hayekians believe that human error is 
real. Time is required to discover suboptimal patterns of resource allocation and to 
accomplish improvements. 
Although the details of their analyses differ, Stiglerians and Hayekians 
reach identical policy conclusions when confronted with claims that some putative 
market failure must be corrected by the state. That policy conclusion is almost 
always that alleged market failure does not benefit from state action. The claim is 
dismissed as being false by Stiglerians, or as one that fails to appreciate the 
superiority of the entrepreneurial market process over the political process in 
discovering and correcting market failures by Hayekians. 
When Stiglitzians146 are confronted by an Observer with allegations of 
some market failure they are generally sympathetic. Stiglitzians have no great 
confidence in the ability of private parties to correctly assess the state of the market 
or to competently act in pursuit of profit to improve resource allocation. They have 
confidence in the ability of government officials, especially economists, to assess 
the state of the market and to competently design and carry out effective 
interventions that generate improved resource allocation. Stiglitzians’ policy 
conclusions are very different from that of Stiglerians and Hayekians. 
 
 144. Named for George Stigler, who argues that markets are hyper-efficient and, therefore, are 
almost never marked by Pareto-inefficient patterns of resource allocation. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, 
The Xistence of X-Efficiency, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 213, 216 (1976). 
 145. Named for F.A. Hayek, who argues that free markets generally tend toward optimal patterns of 
resource allocation but, because of imperfections in human knowledge and because of dynamic changes 
in the economy, this tendency is always a work in progress. Put differently, Hayek believes that the 
market is a process of constantly discovering and correcting error, but a process that is never complete. 
See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in THE MARKETS AND OTHER ORDERS 
304-13 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2014). 
 146. Named for Joseph Stiglitz, who argues that imperfect information, human weakness, and 
institutional imperfections generate a great deal of market failure - failure that can be reliably corrected 
only by government officials. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Markets, Market Failures, and Development, 
79 AM. ECON. REV. 197 (1989). 
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By exploring the strengths and weaknesses of these three dispositions we 
demonstrate that these positions, and others that might exist or be imagined, are 
just that: dispositions. None can be proven analytically to be correct or even to be 
better than the others. Where any person comes down—as a Stiglerian, a Hayekian, 
or a Stiglitzian—is determined by that person’s judgment, or even by his or her 
priors, about the competence of people acting privately compared to that of people 
acting politically. 
Despite the differences that separate Stiglerians from Hayekians, and both 
of these tribes from Stiglitzians, all three accept the reality of externalities. 
Stiglerians insist that almost all externalities are what Buchanan and Stubblebine 
labeled “Pareto-irrelevant externalities”—that is, externalities that, while real, are 
not worth the cost of internalizing. Hayekians agree with Stiglerians that many 
externalities about which politicians, professors and pundits complain, are Pareto-
irrelevant, but Hayekians disagree with Stiglerians’ insistence that all externalities 
are such. Hayekians concede the reality of Pareto-relevant externalities, but argue 
that these will reliably and cost-effectively be corrected, sooner or later, by private 
market forces. Stiglitzians, of course, agree with the Hayekians that Pareto-relevant 
externalities exist in the real world, but disagree that many alleged externalities are 
Pareto-irrelevant. Stiglitzians insist also, contrary to Hayekians, that few, if any, 
Pareto-relevant externalities can be corrected adequately by market forces. Unlike 
the Hayekians, Stiglitzians believe that government officials can correct Pareto-
relevant externalities in cost-effective ways. 
We agree more with the Hayekians than with either the Stiglerians or the 
Stiglitzians. However, we part company with all three in our understanding of the 
nature of externalities and offer a different conception of externalities, one based 
upon expectations. We argue that nearly all discussions of externalities proceed 
from a flawed understanding of third-party effects, whether they are negative or 
positive. As we will discuss, we conclude that externalities are far less common 
than is commonly asserted. 
A standard description of an externality is to say that it is an unbargained-
for “third-party” effect. That is, it is a “spillover” effect that arises whenever an 
actor fails to take account of the cost or the benefit that an instance of her action 
has on a third party. 
Our objection is to the typical Pigouvian manner of reckoning social costs. 
The common assertion of externalities fails to take adequate account of 
expectations. Assertions of externalities—of “market failure”—pay insufficient 
attention to the fact that real-world economic actors form reasonable expectations 
about the likelihood that they or their properties will encounter spillover effects 
from other people’s actions. When people expect certain consequences, either 
physically or to their own properties’ market values, from other people’s actions, 
they adjust their own actions to minimize the costs they bear, or to maximize the 
benefits they receive, from the expected actions of others. These expectations and 
the adjustments they spark “internalize” the consequences of spillover effects that 
appear as externalities in standard market-failure analyses. The internalized 
reasonable expectations of spillover effects are reflected in, and incorporated into, 
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property rights and the value placed on them.147 Once incorporated, these 
expectations render many spillover effects that appear on casual observation to be 
externalities to be, in fact, part of the structure of property rights. 
A common example: someone who buys land located near a busy airport 
should reasonably expect to regularly hear noise from airplanes.148 That person’s 
property right to her land does not include the right to be free of airport noise. In 
the language of the common law, the person “comes to the nuisance.”149 The price 
that she pays for this land is discounted to reflect the absence of this particular 
“stick” in the bundle of rights received when she purchased the land. This price 
discount reflects the internalization of this landowner of airport spillover effects. 
DEFINING CLASSES OF EXTERNALITIES 
Given that expectations constantly adjust to the changing state of the 
world, property rights, and the prices attached to them, constantly adjust in an on-
going process of internalization. In a world in which people can and do change 
activities to reflect their evolving expectations, externalities exist only when 
spillover effects are unexpected. The following examples help to demonstrate this 
principle. 
(1a) Smith owns a piece of land. Jones offers Smith $10,000 for an 
easement allowing Jones to lawfully drive his truck to and fro across Smith’s 
unpaved land for the next ten years. Smith accepts. Jones then drives across 
Smith’s land according to the agreement. Although Jones’s truck leaves tire marks 
on Smith’s land, which is unsightly to Smith, there is no externality. 
Why isn’t Jones’ crossing Smith’s land an externality? One answer is: 
because Jones bought the right to drive his truck across Smith’s land. While true, 
this answer doesn’t reveal the essence of the situation. This essence is that Smith 
should expect Jones to drive across his land and that driving will likely leave 
unsightly tire marks. 
The moment Smith sold the easement to Jones, Smith expected Jones 
would drive across his land and to leave tire marks that trucks typically make. The 
price Smith received for the easement reflects his expectations of such negative 
spillovers. Smith internalized Jones’ infliction of physical damage to Smith’s land 
when he reasonably came to expect such damage. There is, therefore, no externality 
despite one person (Jones) physically damaging property belonging to another 
person (Smith). 
(1b) Changing the example slightly yields a different outcome. If Jones 
owns no easement over Smith’s land but drives his truck across the land and leaves 
unsightly tire marks, then Smith may suffer a negative externality. 
More to the point, his expectation of not having his property invaded and 
damaged by another has been violated. A court would be expected to grant Smith’s 
 
 147. See, e.g., M. Rahmatian & L. Cockerill, Airport Noise and Residential Housing Valuation in 
Southern California: A Hedonic Pricing Approach 1 INT’L J. ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 17, 18 (2004) 
(showing that the greater the exposure of homes to airport noise the lower are the prices of the homes). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See, e.g., Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: 
Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 273, 273 (1998). 
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request to enjoin Jones’s damaging actions, as well as hold Jones liable for 
damages inflicted on Smith. 
(2a) Johnson’s suburban residence is ten miles from downtown, where she 
works. She drives to and from her office on open-access roads. Her route, were she 
to drive it at 3:00 am, would take 15 minutes, but during rush hour the drive 
typically takes an hour. The standard economist’s assessment of this situation is 
that it is rife with negative externalities.150 The economist reasons that, when 
deciding whether or not to drive on particular roads each driver considers only the 
costs and benefits that she experiences by driving. Drivers do not account for the 
costs their driving imposes on other drivers. But there is no externality. 
Each day as she sets out to drive during rush hour, Johnson is aware of the 
likely traffic conditions. Although she’s unhappy with those conditions, she 
chooses to drive on the traffic-jammed roads. She expects to encounter heavy 
traffic during rush hour. She internalizes the effects of the actions of the many 
other drivers who share the roads with her. Moreover, her internalization of traffic 
congestion causes Johnson to alter her behavior. Where she chooses to live might 
be closer to her place of work than it would be if she didn’t expect to encounter 
congestion. 
The price of her abode reflects expectations of congestion. Ceteris 
paribus, the prices of homes any given distance from a city center is usually lower 
the greater the expected amount of traffic from that location. Suppose that Johnson 
would have paid $200,000 for a home ten miles from the city if she expected little 
traffic during rush hour. If she expects heavy traffic, however, the value of that 
home to her falls. The market value of the home also falls because most people 
share Johnson’s expectations of heavy traffic. So Johnson purchases the home for, 
say, $180,000 rather than the $200,000 that she would have paid in the absence of 
traffic congestion. The lower price of her home compensates her for the congestion 
she expects to endure during the commute. 
(2b) Suppose instead that Johnson bought a home that, although it is ten 
miles from where she works, is just off of a privately owned, restricted-access 
highway on which tolls are charged at market rates. The tolls are scientifically 
designed to ensure that traffic volume are always socially “optimal.” Given that 
traffic congestion on an identical open-access road imposes unnecessarily high 
costs on drivers—that is, given that the cost to each driver of the congestion is 
assumed to be inefficiently high—the cost to Johnson of paying tolls to drive on 
the uncongested restricted-access highway is lower than is the cost to Johnson of 
enduring the congestion that regularly slows her commute on an identical open-
access highway. In this example, Johnson’s daily commute is not inefficiently 
slow. The cost to her of using the tolled, restricted-access highway is lower than is 
the cost to her of using the open-access highway, justifying to her the $200,000 
price she paid for her home just off the restricted-access highway. 
 
 150. Economists often advocate addressing the externality by pricing highway use, especially at peak 
hours, so as to close the gap between private costs and social costs—those imposed by a driver on other 
drivers. The assertion that raising the costs of driving will result in less driving is obviously correct. 
Harold Demsetz, The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. 
Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2011) (discussing the congested roads example). 
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Unexpectedly, a year after Johnson bought this home, the government 
uses eminent domain to seize the restricted-access highway and convert it into a 
public open-access highway. Johnson’s commute suddenly becomes much longer. 
We might say that the government’s conversion of the highway from restricted- to 
open-access imposes an externality on Johnson. Not only does she find herself 
confronting a longer commute than she reasonably expected when she bought the 
home, but the market value of her home will fall to reflect the increased 
inefficiency of the commute.151 Because the government’s action was unexpected, 
Johnson could not reasonably have adjusted to that action to shield herself from 
these losses. As in example (1b) above, a party here suffers an unexpected loss, or 
cost, because another party acted in a way not reasonably expected. 
(3a) Williams has worked since she was 18 years old in a factory making 
furniture. Williams loses her job at age 50 because consumers’ preference for 
lower-priced furniture imports causes her employer to go bankrupt. Williams 
suffers a loss. 
Economists classify Williams’s loss as a “negative pecuniary externality.” 
That is, she incurs a real loss but its value is more than offset by pecuniary gains to 
consumers from the lower prices paid for furniture. That is, negative pecuniary 
externalities are offset by positive pecuniary externalities of at least the same value. 
Because there is no net social loss with pecuniary externalities, economists 
conclude that corrective action by government is neither necessary nor appropriate. 
That is, with pecuniary externalities there is no market failure. The failure 
of consumers, when buying furniture, to account for the consequences of their 
decisions on Williams and other domestic furniture producers is not a failure of 
consumers to take adequate account of the marginal social costs of their decisions. 
With pecuniary externalities, there is no divergence between the marginal private 
cost and the marginal social cost of a decision. Although consumers do not account 
for the cost that purchases of imports imposes on workers in domestic furniture 
factories, the consumer does account for gains from lower prices. Because the gains 
to consumers from competition-driven economic change can be shown to be at 
least as large as the losses the changes cause producers, there is no net social cost 
of competition-driven economic change. 
 
 151. Alternative parties can be said to cause the negative externality: one is the government; the 
other is the set of drivers whose actions create congestion. We can blame one or the other but not both. 
If the government had not converted the highway into an open-access road, the congestion would not 
occur. On the other hand, if each driver would altruistically and accurately take into consideration the 
effects that her use of the road has on other drivers, the congestion likewise would not occur. Deciding 
which of these two parties to ‘blame’ likely reflects (a la Dahlman, supra note 141) the analysts’ 
normative position rather than any objective or scientific principle. Nevertheless, because the 
government in this example actively altered an existing property-rights arrangement—and because, in 
doing so, it reasonably should have expected that one result would be traffic congestion—the 
government seems is the party appropriately identified as imposing the externality on Johnson (and on 
others similarly situated). In contrast to the government, none of the drivers on the now-congested, 
open-access highway took active steps to alter the property-rights arrangement. Each driver simply 
continues to behave consistently as a rational, utility-maximizing private actor. Given the choice of 
identifying one or the other of these parties as the ‘cause’ of the externality, choosing the party that 
actively and unexpectedly altered the property-rights arrangements makes most sense. 
Winter 2019 EXTERNALITY: ORIGINS AND CLASSIFICATIONS 27 
We agree with the standard economic analysis that in this example there is 
neither economic inefficiency nor any need for corrective intervention by 
government. But we disagree with those who contend the furniture worker suffers 
an externality. In a market economy, particularly one in which employment 
contracts are at-will, no worker reasonably expects that she will keep her job for as 
long as she wants it. Put differently, Williams expects, or should expect, that she 
might lose her job for any number of regularly occurring reasons, including 
changes in market conditions. 
Williams reasonably expected the prospect of job loss and, therefore, 
internalized the prospect. She adjusted to it or reasonably should have adjusted to 
it. For example, she and other furniture workers likely earned wages higher than for 
work at similar jobs in industries less likely to be subject to increased import 
competition. When the job loss occurs, Williams suffers no externality; because 
there are no spillover effects from other people’s actions that are not already 
internalized. She suffers nothing that “ought” to be compensated or that other 
people ought to be taxed for or prevented from imposing on her. 
(3b) Williams at age 18 is unusually forward-looking and unusually 
economically risk-averse. She seeks the most secure employment possible.152 She 
avoids employment in “tradable-goods” industries (ones likely to suffer 
competition from imports). She instead seeks employment in an occupation 
unlikely to be destroyed by imports. Williams moves to Nevada and begins work as 
a prostitute. After twenty years of working legally as a prostitute, the State of 
Nevada unexpectedly outlaws prostitution statewide.153 Williams might be said to 
suffer an externality. Having no good reason to expect that her occupation would 
be outlawed, Williams loses the opportunity to earn a living in that particular 
occupation, but, more to our point, she had no opportunity to adjust her actions to 
protect against this unexpected change. 
Each of these examples features a person who experiences negative 
consequences, spillover effects, as a result of the actions of others. Yet in examples 
(1a), (2a), and (3a) the person expects or should expect to experience these 
consequences. These expectations lead each to adjust his or her actions to 
compensate for the expected negative effects. These expectations and the 
adjustments they spark internalize the spillover effects on the individuals. In 
contrast, in examples (1b), (2b), and (3b), none of the individuals expects, or has 
reason to expect, the negative spillovers. The individuals had no opportunity to 
adjust actions to such negative spillover effects. The spillover effects in these cases 
can sensibly be called “externalities.” 
Example (1a) describes an obvious case of a spillover effect not being an 
externality on the person suffering that effect. Landowner Smith gave Jones 
 
 152. The most secure employment possible, in fact, is one that we rule out here: self-sufficient 
existence, which necessarily involves subsistence farming. A truly self-sufficient person, one with no 
economic contact with others beyond his or her immediate family, will never want for work. His very 
survival requires constant toil and effort. The fact that almost no one today chooses such an existence 
implies that almost everyone today chooses to incur the risks of market variations in exchange for the 
benefits made available to those who participate in the market economy. 
 153. As of this writing, that appears to be a possibility. See Jim Carlton, Is the Party Over for 
Nevada’s Legal Brothels? Possibility of a Ban Looms, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2018. 
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permission to take the actions that generate some negative effect on Smith.154 The 
absence of an externality in (2a) is less obvious. Nevertheless, no externality exists 
in (2a) because commuter and homeowner Johnson, expecting long commutes, 
takes other drivers’ actions into account and changes her behavior accordingly. 
Given the existing property-rights structure of the roads (open-access), Johnson has 
no property or other legal interest that is damaged, obstructed, or taken from her by 
other drivers. In (3a), Williams has no legal right to continued employment at any 
particular job and, thus, when she loses her job making furniture, has no legal 
interest is upended. 
Matters differ in each of the “b” parts of the examples. In (1b) Smith 
suffers a violation of a legal right long recognized and enforced at common law. 
The violations in (2b) and (3b) are less straightforward but real. The expectations 
of Johnson in (2b) and Williams in (3b) were grounded in the existing structure of 
law and legislation. There was no reason to expect to change. While unlike in (1b) 
neither of the individuals in (2b) and (3b) suffer an infringement of a right 
recognized at common law, each of the individuals in (2b) and (3b) suffer as a 
result of a legal change that no reasonable person had cause to expect. 
In sum, in a world in which people adjust activities155 to reflect their 
expectations, externalities exist only when spillover effects are unexpected. When 
expected, spillover effects are incorporated into the structure of property rights. 
Transactions such as the purchase and sale of property and creation of contracts 
and protection of those interests from tortious interference result in market prices 
for those rights that reflect expected spillover effects. In the example of Jones 
buying an easement across Smith’s land, Smith knows his enjoyment of his 
property will be affected. If after six years, Smith sells his land to Wilson, the 
property right that Wilson acquires does not allow him to unilaterally prevent Jones 
from crossing the land according to the terms of the easement. When the easement 
was created, the nature of the property changed. 
In the example of Johnson driving on open-access roads, she has no 
reasonable expectation of enjoying exclusive use of the roads. Even if Johnson, 
when suing to reduce the number of drivers, proves that when she began to use the 
roads they were not as clogged with traffic, the court would deny her claim to 
possess a right to less traffic on those roads. Johnson should have expected the 
possibility that open-access roads could become clogged with traffic. If, in contrast, 
she had built and operated the roads privately, reserving to herself the right to 
decide who uses the roads and on what terms, matters would differ. Drivers who 
use the roads, without Johnson’s permission, even if she was not using the road, 
violate her property right. 
In the case of Williams who works in a furniture factory, her agreement to 
work at-will means that she should reasonably expect the possibility that one day 
she will lose her job. She has no property right in her job. If Williams’s employer 
 
 154. In the example, Smith received from Jones payment for this permission. Yet such a payment is 
not necessary. The essence of the example would be unchanged if Smith had given the easement to 
Jones free of charge. 
 155. These activities include the expression of valuations through decisions to buy and to sell (and to 
not buy and to not sell). 
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contractually agreed never to fire her for as long as the employer remained in 
business, then Williams would have, by contract, certain property rights in her job. 
A WORLD FILLED WITH SPILLOVERS 
Prices, wages, and other market values adjust to reflect expectations of 
spillover effects. Although obvious when stated, this conclusion is more 
substantive than it first appears. Most discussions of externalities begin mid-stream. 
Landowners are assumed to exist and are assumed to use their lands in certain 
ways. Factories are assumed to exist and are assumed to produce certain outputs 
using certain production methods. Drivers are assumed to exist driving wherever 
they happen to drive. Residential areas are assumed to exist in locations particular 
distances from factories. The analyst then identifies spillovers across parties. 
In a common example, a factory pollutes the air used by a nearby laundry 
to clean the clothes of its customers, thereby inflicting a spillover on the laundry. A 
Pigouvian or Stiglitzian draws a graph showing that the marginal private cost 
confronted by the factory owner is less than the marginal social cost of the 
factory’s production activities. The Pigouvian concludes that the factory produces 
too much output that results in too much pollution. Therefore, corrective taxes or 
regulations are necessary. The Coasean agrees with the Pigouvian that a spillover 
exists, but disagrees on the solution. The Coasean notes that if rights to air quality 
exist, the parties can bargain or litigate to enforce the rights. The “optimal” result 
will arise because the party who values the property right the highest will buy it 
from or not sell it to the other party. 
Factories and laundries do not simply pop into existence. Each sets up at a 
particular time and place, with a set of expectations about what it may and may not 
do. The decision by the party coming to the scene after the first party arrived 
determines the second party’s expectations about the state of the world. If the 
laundry arrived on the scene after the factory, decisions by the laundry owner must 
incorporate legitimate expectations of the operation of the factory, including 
whatever spillover effects are likely to affect it. The price the laundry owner paid 
for the site reflects these expectations as do the supplies the laundry owner buys to 
operate his laundry. Given that the laundry owner chose to set up shop when and 
where he did, and given the expectations that he had in doing so, or should have 
had given the rights structure, it is difficult to see in such examples effects that are 
called “externalities” demanding governmental action. 
The physical spillover effects the factory has on the laundry are 
indisputable but are not externalities. The laundry owner’s expectation of the 
effects must be presumed to be internalized in his decisions. Put differently, these 
spillover effects are part of the definition of the both the laundry-owners’ property 
rights and of the factory’s owner’s property rights: to wit, the factory owns the 
right to emit pollutants of this sort into the air, while the laundry owner owns no 
right to be free of such pollutants from this factory. 
Externalities exist only when another party’s actions create unexpected 
spillover effects.156 Put differently, for there to be no externality, all that is 
 
 156. That is, externalities occur only when an existing property-rights arrangement is changed or 
violated. 
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necessary is that the party encountering spillover effects expects or reasonably 
should expect to encounter them. This expectation prompts the party to adjust to 
the expected effects.157 To the extent that adjustments to the spillover effects do not 
occur because the benefits of adjusting do not justify the costs of doing so, the 
market value of affected properties adjusts to reflect the spillover effects. 
When a spillover is expected, it is internalized on the parties to the effects, 
which eliminates the externality. Internalizing the externality does not require the 
party who might conventionally be identified as ‘causing’ the spillover effect to 
take account of the effect either consciously or by responding appropriately to 
prices, taxes, or subsidies that include the value of the effect on the ‘victim’ of the 
spillover. For example, for there to be no externality, it is not necessary, although it 
would be sufficient, for a railroad to take account of the effects that sparks from its 
locomotives have on the owners of lands adjoining the railroad’s tracks. If the 
landowners expect their lands will be damaged from the sparks of locomotives, the 
landowners internalize these costs. The landowners adjust in various ways, say by 
moving their crops further from the tracks or by growing crops less likely to burn 
easily. Further, the market value of the land incorporates the landowners’ success 
or failure at avoiding the ill-effects of the sparks. 
When a pattern of effects is expected, the details of those expectations 
define the specific contours and contents of property rights. If owners of land 
adjoining railroad tracks expect routine damage to the land from locomotive sparks, 
the landowner does not own the right to be free of railroad sparks. That right is not 
one of the sticks in the landowners’ bundle of rights. That stick is owned by the 
railroad. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, NOT SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Unlike in the literature on externalities, nothing said here suggests that the 
absence of spillovers implies a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources. The problem 
is not externalities or spillover effects whether anticipated or not. The problem, if 
one asserts there is a problem, is in the structure of property rights. It is necessary 
to have a set of institutions that allows parties to make deals under a set of 
enforceable and protected rights. 
This approach describes traditional common-law courts. In Sturgis v. 
Bridgeman, the court was not called upon to make an economic assessment 
regarding which of the two parties is the least-cost avoider.158 The court was asked 
to determine which party had the property right to the noise and vibration 
environment of the building: the confectioner or the physician. When courts make 
such determinations they ask which party acted consistently within prevailing 
expectations or rights structure.159 
 
 157. It is possible that the expectation of some spillover effect causes no adjustment in the activities 
of the affected party. The absence of any such adjustment would signal that the costs of any possible 
adjustment outweigh the corresponding benefits. 
 158. Sturgis v. Bridgeman, L.R. 11 Ch. 857 (1879) is the case employed by Coase, supra note 72, 
where noise from a confectioner’s shop made the use of a doctor’s consulting room unpalatable. In that 
case the court enjoined the noise to protect the doctor’s right to quiet enjoyment of his property. 
 159. That is, the rights of contesting parties are determined by existing property rules, not by a 
weighing of the costs and benefits of alternative uses of the property. 
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The process of determining, in any legal case, which party is the least-cost 
avoider is not rational calculation by the court but evolves from human behavior 
leading up to the dispute that gave rise to the case.160 The determinative factor, in 
short, is prevailing custom.161 The courts have long looked to community 
expectations, broadly defined, to discover as best as they can which party acted in a 
way most consistent with expectations.162 That party is the one declared to have 
“the right.” Property rights are a bundle of expectations about how others 
(including the state) will act in different circumstances.163 Expectations may 
originally give rise to de facto property rights which, if courts rule in ways 
consistent with these expectations when disputes arise, become de jure property 
rights.164 Hence. insofar as no one’s legitimate expectations are upset, no 
externality occurs. 
The prevailing pattern of expectations—and, hence, the particular 
arrangement of property rights in which expectations are embedded—is not 
necessarily economically optimal with respect to a particular situation.165 However, 
having clear property rules in place allows parties to adjust their behavior to the 
legal structure. The point is that no externality occurs when spillover effects are 
expected, or reasonably should be expected. In some instances, altering existing 
property rights might improve economic efficiency even if doing so violates 
prevailing expectations.166 
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 166. See Alvin Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 42 (2007) (In 
the example of open-access roads, if government restricts access to drivers who pay tolls that mimic 
market prices, Johnson and other drivers will be made better off. We recognize that certain activities 
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The challenge is not for external observers, such as wise economists, to 
design and implement government policies that “internalize externalities” given 
transitory circumstances. There are few instances when someone experiences a 
consequence that he did not expect or had no good reason to expect, and, hence, to 
which he has not already adjusted his actions in a Pareto-optimal way. The 
challenge is to allow the evolution of a system of property rights that encourages 
productive social cooperation.167 Framing the problem as one centered on external 
effects deflects attention from the core issue and gives rise to the notion that 
planners can respond to issues and help construct statutory or administrative rules 
to enhance economic efficiency as seen by the planners. To believe that approach 
can succeed requires omniscience by such observers who generate policies 
divorced from politics. Both assumptions are absurd.168 
CONCLUSION 
We have reviewed the origins of the concept of externality. It began with 
the noted economist Alfred Marshall more than a century ago. His concern 
centered on the effects of the spread of information that would spur economic 
development. Some information was internal to a firm, some was external 
information that could help spur productivity. His protégé and successor at 
Cambridge, A.C. Pigou, wrote extensively about problems associated with private 
production and consumption decisions. Society would not maximize its well-being 
if private actors were not restrained by legislation designed to ameliorate wrongs, 
such as women working in factories, which was of particular concern. Pigou’s 
distinction between social cost and private cost launched the discussion that 
proceeds apace about the need for governmental action to right economic wrongs. 
Some economists, especially in the 1950s, expanding the work on 
externalities, showed that by pulling just the right levers, higher levels of wealth 
and welfare, all the way up to “bliss points,” could be achieved. Professors 
Scitovsky, Meade, and Bator formalized the model of externality, showing how a 
change in rules, perhaps by imposing taxes on undesirable activities or by ordering 
investment in underutilized areas, could raise social welfare. Nobel laureate James 
Buchanan dismissed such hopes through formal economic logic, showing that the 
justification for state action to rectify private-sector problems applied only to a 
limited set of instances and, in any case, ignored the consequences of turning such 
matters over to the tender mercies of legislatures or the bureaucracies they create 
and monitor. 
Until about 1970 the focus was on more efficient economic planning. For 
years, development economists contended that backwards countries could be pulled 
into modernization and wealth by assorted planning tools such as investment in 
select infrastructure, import substitution policies, and more. However, concern 
 
may be deemed repugnant and so prohibited, such as restrictions on the entertainment called dwarf 
tossing.). 
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about environmental matters soon came to dominate the application of externality. 
For a half-century now, economists have trotted out numerous schemes to reduce 
externalities, that is, close the imagined gap between imagined social optimality 
and private outcomes. 
Professor Baumol swatted aside Buchanan’s analysis and likened 
environmental externalities to underemployment or excess inflation—call in the 
experts and they would change monetary and fiscal policy to balance inflation and 
employment to make the economy great again. Following Baumol, many would-be 
policymakers volunteer to pull the levers of power to fix the environment. Despite 
economists such as Buchanan dismembering the theoretical bases for asserting that 
bliss points can be achieved by policy actions that attack alleged externalities, 
many environmental economists plow ahead, sure that their wisdom, drawn upon 
by well-meaning politicians, will succeed in planning a better environment and 
economy. 
We join Ronald Coase in believing that when property rights are clearly 
established and enforceable, and when parties are free to bargain to rearrange who 
owns and may use property in a productive manner that does not inflict 
unacceptable harm on others, we have the greatest likelihood of sustainable 
economic growth and private protection of property. In terms of economic logic, 
externalities are rare species. More common are claims that things we do not 
happen to like are externalities that should be changed by legislative or 
administrative edict. 
